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THE INDONESIAN ELITE'S VIEW OF THE WORLD 
AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF DEVELOPMENT*
Franklin B. Weinstein
Indonesian foreign policy in the 1960's presented two sharply 
contrasting faces. Under Sukarno's leadership in the first half of 
the decade, Indonesia aspired to the leadership of a radical, anti- 
imperialist international front. Sukarno condemned the prevailing 
international system as an exploitative order in which the old estab­
lished forces (oldefos) of the world sought through economic, politi­
cal, and military means to keep the new emerging forces (nefos) in 
subjugation. Nefos like Indonesia had to fight to perfect and 
preserve their independence, Sukarno declared. He led Indonesia into 
a foreign policy of militant confrontation against imperialism, first 
against the Dutch in West Irian and then against the British in 
Malaysia. Convinced that the exploitative international system had 
to be changed before Indonesia could develop economically, Sukarno 
exalted self-reliance and told the United States to "go to hell with 
your aid." Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in 1965 
was at least in part due to Sukarno's belief that the organization 
had become a symbol of a world order dominated by neo-colonialism and 
imperialism. Nor were the Communist nations, with whom Indonesia still 
had cordial relations, free from suspicion. Sukarno chafed at Soviet 
advice to ease the confrontation against Malaysia and pay more atten­
tion to economic needs; and as Indonesia drew closer to China in 1964 
and 1965, he saw the Soviets grow cooler still. Even China, Djakarta's 
principal supporter in 1965, was viewed with some hesitation. For 
example, when General Yani, the army commander, declared in 1965 that 
the main threat to Indonesia was from the north, meaning China,
Sukarno countered that the threat came from all sides; he made no 
effort to deny that China was a threat. There was really no one 
who could be trusted.
Under Suharto since 1966, Indonesia has become something of a 
model of the new state that eschews flamboyance and orients its 
foreign policy to the needs of economic development. Western economic 
aid and capital investment have been eagerly solicited, the anti­
imperialist crusade has been virtually abandoned, and confrontation 
has been replaced by passivity and talk of regional cooperation.
Before the end of 1966, Indonesia had terminated its confrontation 
against Malaysia, rejoined the United Nations, and reached agreement 
with its western creditors to establish an Inter-Governmental Group 
(IGGI) to coordinate debt renegotiation and new aid commitments. In *I
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting 
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October 1966 a sweeping economic stabilization program, drawn up 
in consultation with the IMF, was adopted. At the end of the year 
a new foreign investment law, containing attractive conditions for 
investors, was passed. In the succeeding years western aid commit­
ments grew progressively larger, the United States and Japan con­
tributing two-thirds of the total. In 1969 a five year develop­
ment plan was announced, with 81 percent of its financing in the 
first year to be derived from foreign sources. Although relations 
with China have remained in suspension since 1967, efforts to 
restore economic relations with the Soviet Union were undertaken 
in 1969; in 1970 Moscow agreed to the long-term rescheduling of 
Indonesian debt repayments, and there was talk of new aid. Where 
Djakarta newspapers had once carried headlines proclaiming Indo­
nesia’s determination to fight to the death against the oldefos, 
now they told of favorable IMF evaluations of Indonesia’s economic 
performance, efforts to win larger aid commitments, and cooperation 
with the former oldefos. No longer was foreign policy described 
as a struggle to preserve Indonesia’s independence and overcome 
the forces of exploitation. Indonesia entered the 1970’s firmly 
embarked on a foreign policy of development.
Given the striking transformation of Indonesian foreign policy, 
it is appropriate to ask what kind of thinking lies beneath the 
new policy. To what degree is Indonesia’s foreign policy of develop­
ment in fact supported by basic underlying attitudes and percep­
tions different from those which backed the anti-imperialist policy 
of Sukarno? Have Indonesia’s present leaders abandoned Sukarno’s 
picture of the international system as a basically exploitative 
order? And what do their attitudes suggest about the future of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy of development in the 1970’s?
Some light is shed on these questions by the results of a re­
search project on Indonesian foreign policy carried out by the 
author in Djakarta between 1968 and 1970. As part of that research, 
an investigation was made of the Indonesian foreign policy elite’s 
nview of the world.” The basic source of this attitudinal data 
was a series of depth interviews carried out with members of the 
foreign policy elite, a group selected on a reputational basis by 
a panel of twelve prominent Indonesians representing a wide variety 
of political perspectives.1 1
1. Of the 75 leaders rated most important by the panel, 64 were 
interviewed at least once, and 53 were given depth interviews 
lasting an average of 7% hours. All of the interviews were con­
ducted by the author and, with only a very few exceptions, in the 
Indonesian language. Some 30 second echelon leaders were also 
interviewed one or more times to add depth to the views of partic­
ular groups. Besides the interviews, there were several supple­
mentary sources of attitudinal data, including a wide range of 
Indonesian newspapers, government documents, political party state­
ments, and 146 essays submitted in a contest on Indonesia’s nation­
al identity. The interviewer’s nationality, of course, poses a 
methodological problem, since it is reasonable to assume that many 
Indonesians might hesitate to speak as critically of the west to 
an American as they would among themselves. As will be seen be­
low, however, the argument advanced in this paper is that Indonesia’s 
leaders are in fact suspicious of western intentions. The
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The foreign policy elite's view of the world was analyzed in 
terms of two attitude constructs which represent an important 
dichotomy in the way Indonesian leaders look at the world.2 The 
first is a set of assumptions and perceptions suggesting that the 
outside world is essentially a hostile place, in which there are 
always forces at work seeking to exploit and subjugate Indonesia. 
Every nation, of course, has its enemies. But those who perceive 
the outside world as hostile are worried about their "friends" as 
well. The implication of this view is that Indonesia's control of 
its own destiny is in jeopardy and that foreign policy must be used 
to defend the nation's independence; a foreign policy of development, 
based on heavy reliance on foreign aid, is considered risky because 
the potential aid givers are suspected of posing a threat to the 
nation's independence. The second attitude construct suggests not 
a world of hostile and avaricious powers, but rather one which in­
cludes powers that are basically willing to help Indonesia because 
of shared interests. Heavy dependence on foreign aid and investment 
is not seen as a threat to the nation's independence because of the 
mutuality of interests between aid-giver and recipient. Though the 
leaders interviewed generally inclined toward one attitude construct 
or the other, most reflect in their views some mixture of the two.
In viewing the outside world, many tended to express alternately 
feelings of security and insecurity, strength and weakness, trust 
and suspicion, and superiority and inferiority.
Basic Assumptions About the Nature 
of the International System
The interviews reveal that attitudes stressing the hostility of 
the outside world still prevail, though ambivalence and inconsistency 
are present in the views of most members of the foreign policy elite. 
The data suggest that the sharp reversal of policies in 1966 was 
accompanied by much less change in underlying attitudes than one might 
have expected. Sukarno's picture of the international system as an 
order dominated by exploitative forces whose interests conflict with 
those of Indonesia still finds broad support among the foreign policy 
elite. This perception of hostility is shared even by a number of 
the young leaders (25 to 35 years old) known for their leadership of 
the anti-Sukarno movement and for their criticism of the former 
President's failure to attend to the needs of economic development. 
Unlike many of their elders, for whom the perception of a hostile 
world is a legacy of the ideological and psychological turmoil of the 
anti - colonial struggle and the revolution, these young people draw 
their conclusions mainly from their analysis of Indonesia's present 
weakness and vulnerability, especially vis-a-vis Japan. Given their 
basis, these perceptions seem likely to persist for some time.
possibility that their criticism of the west was subdued because 
the interviewer was an American only strengthens the case being 
argued here.
2. This dichotomy and the analytical framework of which it is a part 
are elaborated in some detail in Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Uses 
of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of 
Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries," World Politics 
(forthcoming).
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The "Pretty Girl Analogy"
The image of a hostile world is reflected in the widely 
accepted analogy between Indonesia and a pretty maiden who is 
constantly being approached by men who want to take advantage 
of her. This analogy, suggested by several Indonesian leaders 
as a way of characterizing Indonesia's position in the world, 
was presented to the foreign policy elite in the course of the 
interviews. The response was one of overwhelming agreement with 
the analogy. Of fifty who expressed an opinion concerning its 
validity, forty leaders--that is, eighty percent--saw at least 
some truth in it. More than fifty percent asserted that the 
analogy has a great deal of validity. These sentiments were by 
no means concentrated among surviving "old order" elements. 
Substantial agreement with the analogy could be found in practical­
ly every important group, though some were more enthusiastic 
about it than others. Strongest agreement came from the top levels 
of the army and the foreign ministry and from leaders of the PNI 
(Indonesian Nationalist Party) and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist 
Party).3 The technocrats--academics, mainly economists, many of 
whom now serve in highly influential government positions--were 
somewhat lower but still more than seventy percent in agreement. 
Least enthusiastic about the analogy were the leaders of the 
Catholic and Islamic political parties (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
Agreement With the Pretty Girl 
Analogy--By Major Groups
Group It Contains It Contains
Truth (Much) No Truth
Army 9 (8) 1Foreign Ministry 5 (S) 1PNI 8 (6) 1PSI 4 (4) 1Technocrats 5 (3) 2Catholic Party 3 (0) 1Islamic Parties 3 (1) 2
All Foreign Policy Elite 40 (26) 10
The breadth of agreement on the validity of comparing Indonesia 
to a harassed pretty girl is further suggested when generational re­
sponses are examined. It is part of the conventional wisdom in
3. Though the PSI, banned by Sukarno in 1960, has not been formally 
rehabilitated, there remains a small, but important, group of 
leaders who continue to meet regularly.
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Indonesia that members of the youngest generation are pragmatic, 
self-confident men, free of the ideological and psychological pres­
sures fomented by the anti-colonial struggle and the revolution. 
Several people suggested that the pretty girl analogy represented 
a way of thinking designed to deal primarily with the older genera­
tion's psychological problems. It was "something the older genera­
tion told itself in order to boost its own self-image," said one 
young leader. Another student leader conceded that "there is a 
very high level of suspicion of foreigners still existing in this 
society," but, he claimed, it is "almost non-existent" among students. 
Though some have been more influenced by Sukarno's rhetoric than they 
would admit, it is true that the youngest generation of leaders sees 
itself as more pragmatic and less conscious of ideology than its 
predecessors. This has not, however, made them less concerned about 
threats to Indonesia's independence. There is no significant differ­
ence among the generations with respect to those who see at least 
some truth in the analogy (see Table 2). The youngest generation 
did show a clear reluctance to embrace the analogy with enthusiasm, 
partly, one may hypothesize from the nature of their answers, because 
of a consciousness that this was not a line of thinking which their 
generation was expected to accept.
TABLE 2
Agreement With the Pretty Girl 
Analogy--By Age Groups*
Generation It Contains It Contains
Truth (Much) No Truth
1928 Generation 6 (4) 21945 Generation 29 (21) 7
1966 Generation 5 CD 1
* The generational groupings commonly used by Indo­
nesians are employed here. As a general guideline, 
the 1928 Generation refers to those born before 
1910; the 1945 Generation denotes those born be­
tween 1911 and 1935; and the 1966 Generation refers 
to those born after 1935.
Moreover, the assumption that a pragmatic outlook is somehow 
inconsistent with a belief that Indonesia can be compared to a 
harassed pretty girl does not stand up. It would be a mistake to 
assume that agreement with the analogy reflects essentially the views 
of Indonesians who have a narrow ideological perspective. The leaders 
interviewed were classified, where possible, as ideologues or prag­
matists. This classification was based on three considerations: the
extent to which they generally tended to explain international rela­
tions in ideological terms; the importance they attached to ideology 
as a force in international relations; and their self-description 
either as pragmatists or as men to whom ideology is important.1* As 4
4. It should be pointed out that men who see themselves as pragmatists
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Table 3 shows, the pragmatists actually demonstrated slightly more 
agreement with the analogy than did the ideologues.
TABLE 3
Agreement with the Pretty Girl Analogy-- 
Ideologues vs. Pragmatists
It Contains It Contains
Truth (Much) No Truth
- Ideologues 13 (9) 6
Pragmatists 15 (9) 4
Clearly, then, those who attribute validity to the pretty girl 
analogy represent a wide diversity of political groupings, all the 
generations, and both ideologues and pragmatists. It would be 
dangerous, of course, to place too much significance on the terms 
of the analogy itself. It did originate with the Indonesians, and 
when it was raised in discussions with the foreign policy elite, 
many indicated that it was a frequently used image. But it would 
obviously be foolish to suggest that all those who agreed with the 
analogy would have put it that way had it not been suggested to 
them by the interviewer's question. More important than the 
specifics of the analogy itself are the reasons they found it con­
genial and the arguments they brought forth in the discussion 
stimulated by it.
Those who expounded on the pretty girl analogy as an accur­
ate characterization of Indonesia's position in the world offered 
a number of explanations for their country's predicament. A com­
mon line of reasoning, particularly among military leaders, 
emphasizes geo-political factors. Indonesia's strategic location 
and wealth of natural resources are said to make the country 
especially vulnerable to the predatory designs of more powerful 
nations. It is suggested that those geographic considerations 
place the country in an unusual state of jeopardy, because they 
constitute incentives for larger powers to seek to dominate Indo­
nesia. "Our wealth makes us vulnerable," asserted several leaders. 
One army general with an important role in foreign policy put it 
this way:
If you look at Indonesia's location, you can see that 
we are in a crossroads position. From all sides there 
are people who would like to use Indonesia for their 
own purposes. The Japanese see us as a source of raw 
materials. The Communists realize that if they
need not necessarily be said to be without any ideology. But 
they tend to be less conscious of the ideological assumptions 
they may make and less inclined to use ideology as a referent 
in framing political analyses.
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could control Indonesia, then the smaller nations nearby 
would be much easier to control. Russia is very inter­
ested in Indonesia. The United States sees the 
strategic importance of Indonesia too. Thus there 
are always threats to Indonesia’s independence.
There is, to be sure, a strong and widespread belief that Indone­
sia’s material advantages constitute a long-run asset, which will even­
tually help to assure Djakarta an important role in international 
relations, besides bringing prosperity to the land. But so long as 
Indonesia remains weak and underdeveloped, it is felt, its strategic 
location and natural resources will continue to be more a liability 
than a source of strength. The country’s weakness is said to create 
a power vacuum which outside forces are bound to try to fill. The 
Indonesian leaders’ picture of their country as a field of competition 
among the big powers is, of course, the product of Indonesia’s long­
term historical experience, as well as their analysis of the current 
situation. The tendency to see their material advantages as a source 
of danger derives from their conception of the colonial experience as 
one which was motivated primarily by the Dutch desire to exploit Indo­
nesia’s natural wealth. The Indonesian leaders are accustomed to 
the idea that their country’s natural resources historically have led 
foreigners to take advantage of Indonesia. After independence, this 
belief was reinforced by the Cold War situation of the 1950’s, in 
which Indonesia was in fact wooed and pressured by both sides. Though 
many Indonesian leaders today see the Americans and the British as 
withdrawing from Southeast Asia, they fear a new scramble for influ­
ence, led this time by the Japanese and the Chinese.
From leaders of practically every segment of the foreign policy 
elite, the pretty girl analogy elicited expressions of concern about 
economic domination. It seems evident that for a great many Indonesian 
leaders economic imperialism is one of the principal realities of con­
temporary international life. This view has been traditionally identi­
fied with the PNI (and, of course, the Communists), but it is by no 
means exclusively a PNI perspective. For example, a prominent Christian 
leader expressed doubt that the industrialized nations of the world 
really desire economic development in Indonesia. He compared the way 
Indonesians feel about the outside world to the way slum dwellers feel 
when a wealthy person comes to visit: there is bound to be suspicion.
A foreign ministry official pointed to the fact that so much of the 
foreign investment taking place in Indonesia is ’’exploitative,,! that 
is, investors export the raw materials without building refineries, 
lumber mills, and other processing plants in Indonesia. One 
technocrat with an American Ph.D. voiced his fear that even though 
he did not believe that the United States intended to seek economic 
domination in Indonesia, it ’’might just happen in the course of 
things,” because of the enormous power of American capital. Others 
complained about the efforts of some of Indonesia’s creditor nations 
to attach strings to their economic aid. More than one suggested 
that the Japanese seem to feel they need an economic colony and 
regard Indonesia as a prime prospect. One of the best statements of 
the view that nations on all sides seek to take advantage of Indonesia 
for economic reasons came from a strongly anti-Communist army officer:
Sukarno said we were surrounded by imperialists. We said 
yes, but also by Communists. . . .  I don’t know whether 
I would use the term surrounded today, but we must accept 
as reality the fact that colonialism and imperialism still 
exist, both from the non-Communist side and the Communist
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side. . . . Take for example the United States. We 
are trying to sell our tin, it is very important to 
us, and the US exerts its influence to lower the price 
of tin. That may be in the economic interests of the 
US, but we see it as imperialism. The US is trying to 
protect the interests of General Motors, but it is very 
damaging to us. The case of Japan is even more obvious.
They are dependent on imports for 85 percent of their 
energy supply. There can be no question that they are 
going to continue to depress prices, to keep control of 
the situation. This is exploitation. . . .  I am very 
suspicious of the motives of these countries. Maybe 
I am too suspicious, but I can't help it. It is the 
result of our experience. We have been stabbed in the 
back so many times.
For some, the picture of the outside world as hostile is fueled 
by a Marxist analysis that suggests the inevitability of capitalist 
attempts at economic exploitation. But for others, it owes less 
to Marx than to Morgenthau. Many of the more intellectual members 
of the foreign policy elite view international relations as a con­
tinuing power struggle in which weak nations are constantly in 
jeopardy of subjugation by more powerful ones. In their view, 
recognition of the basically hostile character of the outside 
world is simply a sign of political maturity. As a technocrat 
put it: "It is a basic rule that the powerful always try to
dominate the weak for their own advantage . . . there will 
always be powerful nations that will try to take advantage of 
us, as long as we are weak." A socialist leader added: "Every
big power poses a threat to our independence--whether it be 
China, Japan, the United States, or others." And a young PNI 
leader stated flatly: "No big power wants to see any other
country become strong."
A more subtle, but not necessarily unimportant, consideration 
is the matter of race. All of the powers which threaten to domin­
ate Indonesia are either yellow or white, and this fact does not 
seem to have escaped at least some of the Indonesian leaders.
Though their interviewer was an American, several did not hesitate 
to express bluntly their continuing suspicion, rooted in the 
colonial experience, that the Western powers assume their white­
ness makes them superior. There is a fairly widespread perception 
of the United States in particular as a "white racist" society.
As for the Chinese and Japanese, it was perfectly clear that they 
are regarded as dangerous, aggressive alien forces; not infrequent­
ly were they grouped together by the Indonesian leaders as the 
"yellow peril." Closely tied to the race problem is the fear of 
cultural invasion and the resulting loss of national identity. 
Concern about the growing influence of western culture is especial­
ly strong in Islamic circles, but it is certainly not confined to 
them. The Japanese commercial onslaught worries many for cultural 
as well as economic reasons, and it moved one leading technocrat 
to prophesy that "we may wake up some day and find that everything 
we possess is Japanese except our wives." The depth and breadth 
of these concerns are, of course, very difficult to estimate, but 
it does not seem excessive to say that the Indonesian leaders' 
uneasiness about the outside world is accentuated by the racial 
differences between themselves and the powerful nations that 
potentially threaten them.
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Those who failed to see any validity at all in the pretty girl 
analogy emphasized above all their feeling that the perception of the 
outside world as hostile was merely the reflection of an inferiority 
complex. In the words of an Islamic political leader:
The image of Indonesia as a princess constantly in danger 
of being taken advantage of is false. It is an expression 
of the inferiority complex of some Indonesians, especially 
Sukarno. Of course, it is always possible that there 
will be threats from the outside, but I would not say 
that the outside world . . .  is a hostile place. Indo­
nesia is a good deal safer than a lot of other countries.
Others have argued that the pretty girl analogy was an expression not 
of the leaders’ inferiority complex but of an awareness that one pre­
vailed among Indonesians in general. It is said that those who culti­
vated the image of Indonesia as a harassed pretty girl did so in the 
hope of ridding their countrymen of their sense of inferiority. A 
PNI leader put it this way:
[The pretty girl analogy] is something I hear very often 
indeed. It is frequently used in speeches intended to 
convince people that Indonesia is a rich country, and we 
have failed to progress because others are taking advan­
tage of us. But I don’t think it is true. It is just 
something which is used to unify the country and to give 
people confidence. I don’t see the world as being full 
of threats.
Several leaders suggested that it is from a sense of inferiority that 
Indonesians have characterized their country as both more attractive 
and more vulnerable than is in fact the case. ’’Indonesians have been 
kidding themselves to think that they are so rich and important,” 
asserted one technocrat, who nevertheless acknowledged that the 
analogy had some truth though it was oversimplified and exaggerated.
An Islamic leader spoke for a number of others when he doubted Indo­
nesia’s vulnerability: ”We are not nearly as defenseless as that
pretty girl.”
Even some of those who thought the pretty girl analogy accurately 
portrayed Indonesia’s position in the world voiced some concern that 
others might be motivated to such a view by an inferiority complex. 
Whether or not the hostile designs of the outside world pose a 
serious danger to Indonesia depends on how Djakarta responds, it is 
suggested. But, they add, an inferiority complex may push Indonesia 
into an isolationist or ’’super-nationalist” posture. One technocrat 
warned that Indonesia ’’must not be like the pretty girl who never 
goes out because she is afraid of getting raped, and thus never gets 
married. We must have enough self-confidence to have relationships 
with other nations.” An economist put it this way:
This situation [a hostile outside world] can present 
opportunities, as well as dangers. We should not 
have an inferiority complex. We should realize that 
while on the one hand we can be the victims of a clash 
among the big powers who are squabbling for what Indo­
nesia has to offer, we are also in a position to use 
this situation to Indonesia’s advantage. Thus I agree 
with the analysis of the dangers from outside as put 
forth by the super-nationalists, but I disagree on
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how we should respond to that situation. We should 
try to exploit it. . . . Basically . . . the analogy 
is true. But some girls are able to make the most of 
that situation.
There were some, though not many, who contended that except 
for the Communists, the major powers seek only to cooperate with 
Indonesia for the benefit of all concerned. Because Indonesia’s 
relations with the western powers are founded on a mutuality of 
interests, it is said, there is no need to fear exploitation. In 
the words of one army general:
[The pretty girl analogy] really is meant to refer to 
the fact that we have abundant natural resources. But 
tlje foreigners who are being invited by us to come in 
and help develop them are not coming as robbers. It is 
to our benefit to have them come and that is why we have 
invited them. When I look at the outside world, I don't 
see a lot of potential exploiters; I see nations that 
are prepared to help us by providing the technical assist­
ance and capital that we lack.
Another officer compared Indonesia to a man walking in the street.
He must always be alert to see whether a car is coming so that he 
won't get hit, but he does not assume that most drivers are out 
to run him down. Others suggested that the analogy might have 
been valid once, but no longer. "Indonesia is now safer than it 
has ever been before," said one PNI leader. The pretty young girl 
has grown older, remarked a foreign ministry official.
The foreign policy elite's discussion of the pretty girl 
analogy suggests some of the basic lines of reasoning that lead 
a majority to see the outside world as hostile and a minority to 
dissent from that view. One can see clearly how geography, long­
term historical experience, economic weakness and other relatively 
permanent factors mold the basic outlines of the elite's view of 
the world. In the subsequent discussion of international conflicts, 
it is not hard to see how basic perspectives manifested in the 
foreign policy elite's response to the pretty girl analogy influ­
ence the perception of international trends.
International Conflicts
One way of analyzing the foreign policy elite's picture of the 
international system is by probing its interpretations of some of 
the major international conflicts that divide the world and their 
impact on Indonesia. Because our concern here is with the global 
system, the focus is necessarily on the Indonesian leaders' assess­
ment of the motivations underlying the behavior of the great powers 
in international relations. Furthermore, since our interest here 
is in elite perceptions of several international divisions, the 
domestic political considerations that influence the formation of 
government policies with respect to those conflicts are largely 
excluded from this discussion. Four major international conflicts 
were discussed with the foreign policy elite: the Cold War; the
Sino-Soviet dispute; the Middle East conflict; and the clash between 
the nefos and the oldefos.
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The Cold War
Indonesia’s leaders have traditionally viewed the Cold War as a 
source of both opportunity and danger. Cold War competition gave 
considerable impetus to the intervention of the great powers in 
Indonesia, as a result of which substantial material benefits have 
flowed to Indonesians. The greatest diplomatic triumph of the Sukarno 
years, the successful campaign to force the Dutch to yield West 
Irian, was facilitated by the Cold War. In the interviews, most 
acknowledged that the military buildup which preceded the successful 
negotiations was made possible by Soviet aid, and that aid, the 
Indonesians asserted, was inspired by Moscow's desire to thwart the 
west. And, they believe, it was precisely because the United States 
saw a rise in Soviet influence and a growing Indonesian capacity to 
create instability from which Communists might benefit that Washington 
pressured the Dutch to make concessions in 1962. Moreover, it was 
the competitive situation created by the Cold War that made it pos­
sible for Indonesia to draw economic, military, and diplomatic 
assistance from both groups without becoming dependent on either. By 
playing the one off against the other, independence could be maintained. 
As one technocrat put it:
It is a good thing [that the Cold War is still going on], 
because it stimulates the big powers to be interested 
in us. We don't want to see all the big powers with­
draw from Southeast Asia in general or from Indonesia 
in particular. On the contrary, we want all in. It 
is the balancing off among the big powers themselves 
that provides the most advantageous situation for us.
But there was always the danger that the great powers would 
through their intervention acquire such influence as to impair 
Djakarta's capacity to determine its own policies. Especially when 
external or internal conditions have made it hard for them to maintain 
a balance in their relations with the superpowers, the Indonesians have 
worried about their independence. A recurrent theme in the speeches 
of Indonesian leaders for many years has been the fear that Indonesia 
would fall victim to a clash between the Cold War protagonists. A
principal rationale for nonalignment has been the fear of being drawn
into such a conflict. Even where Indonesians have acknowledged the 
benefits which the Cold War has brought them, many are nagged by a 
feeling that the superpowers view Indonesia essentially as a pawn in 
their own struggle for supremacy. Thus some Indonesians, while 
welcoming the material gains which the Cold War has helped their 
country acquire, have had the disturbing suspicion that they have 
been exploited to serve the purposes of others.
Today the Cold War is seen in a new light. International develop­
ments of the last decade have led some to conclude that the Cold War 
is essentially over.5 Even among the larger number who resist such an
5. Seventeen percent of the 54 leaders who answered this question felt 
that the Cold War is over. There were no significant generational 
differences. The 21 ideologues, as might be expected, were 
unanimous in holding that the Cold War is not over, while 39 percent 
of the 23 pragmatists disagreed. Among the major groups only the 
PSI showed a majority believing that the Cold War is over. Agree­
ing that the Cold War is a thing of the past were 2 of 5 Catholics,
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extreme formulation, there are many who believe that the Cold War's 
importance as a factor in international relations is diminishing. 
This trend is attributed by the Indonesians to two developments in 
particular: the declining role of ideology as a determinant of the
behavior of nations and the growing commonality of interests between 
Washington and Moscow.
Ideological conflict is named by a majority as the principal 
cause of the Cold War; the others thought either that the clash of 
national interests between the superpowers was more important, or 
that ideology and national interests were of equal importance.6 
For some, especially PNI and Islamic party leaders, ideology is 
still the central factor in the Cold War. As one PNI leader put 
it: "The world is still really divided into only two groups--the
Communists and the non-Communists . . . there is division within 
the blocs, but when it comes to essential matters, the blocs will 
stand together." Several PNI and Muslim leaders used almost 
identical language to state their conviction that ideology will 
always be of crucial importance in international relations. In 
their words:
The Cold War is basically an ideological struggle and 
cannot possibly end as long as ideological differences 
remain. . . . Ideology has its ups and downs, its 
importance rises and falls in waves, and although in the 
present stage it is rather quiet, sooner or later it 
will re-emerge openly as the central consideration. . . .
A nation is nothing without an ideology. Man must 
have some kind of ideology, something to cling to; 
without it, he is lost. . . .
Most, however, see ideology as a diminishing force. More than 
80 percent of the PSI, Catholic, army, and foreign ministry leaders 
consider ideology less important than it was previously.7 As a
2 of 6 technocrats, 2 of 7 from the army, 1 of 7 from the foreign 
ministry and from the Islamic parties, and none of nine PNI 
leaders.
6. Of 40 leaders, 58 percent saw ideology as the chief cause of the 
Cold War, while 37 percent named national interests, and 5 per­
cent saw both factors as equal in importance. Generational dif­
ferences were slight, but there were substantial divergencies 
among the major groups. All 6 PNI leaders attributed the Cold 
War primarily to ideological conflict, as did 4 of 6 Islamic 
leaders, and 3 of 5 technocrats. The 4 foreign ministry officials 
who discussed this subject were split evenly on whether ideology 
or national interests caused the Cold War. National interests 
were emphasized by 3 of 5 from the army, 3 of 5 from the PSI, and 
4 of 5 Catholic leaders. One Islamic leader and 2 PSI leaders 
were the only ones who saw ideology and national interests as 
equally responsible for the Cold War.
7. Forty-six leaders discussed the importance of ideology in inter­
national relations, and 58 percent saw ideology as a declining 
factor. All 5 PSI leaders and all 4 Catholics felt this way, as 
did 6 of 7 from the army, 5 of 6 from the foreign ministry, and 
4 of 6 technocrats. Arguing that ideology was as important as 
ever were all 7 PNI leaders and 4 of 6 Muslims. Younger leaders
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cabinet minister put it: "The Cold War is over because ideological
differences are just not that important anymore." That the decline 
of ideologies is seen as a major reason for the easing of the Cold 
War is suggested by the generally close correspondence between those 
who agree that the Cold War is over and those who downgrade the 
importance of ideology.
Generally speaking, those who perceive a decline in the importance 
of ideology find this trend reassuring. "It is unwise to base too much 
on ideology," one leader asserted. Quite a few see ideology as a 
positively dangerous force. Ideology is commonly associated with 
expansionism; every ideology seeks to dominate the world, several Indo­
nesians contended. Some see the rise of a pragmatic younger genera­
tion in many countries as a sign that ideologically-based expansionism, 
like that embodied in the Cold War, is becoming obsolete. In the 
words 'of one army general:
Ideology is becoming less of a determining factor in 
international relations. . . . The younger generation, 
practically everywhere, is much less influenced by 
ideology, much less tied to the rigidities of the past, 
and less inclined to be expansionist. . . .  In many 
countries, the older generation still ruling shows 
traits of expansionism, ideologically based or not.
In the United States the older generation is more 
ideological, and there even are expansionist elements 
there. Japan is still under the control of expansion­
ist elements. . . . But the younger generation is 
less inclined to have such attitudes. . . . They 
just want to have a good life.
Others see the change taking place primarily on the Communist side. 
According to a technocrat: "The Russians have become more rational,
more pragmatic." In any case, most of the foreign policy elite 
would agree that the decrease in the ideological content of the Cold 
War has enhanced Indonesia's security in two ways: it has reduced
the prospect of a cataclysmic clash between the superpowers, and 
it has led Washington and Moscow to ease somewhat their pressures 
on countries like Indonesia.
But the decline of ideology also poses certain risks. The Cold 
War is generally seen as developing into what most regard as a less 
dangerous form of conflict, a kind of competition among the great powers 
for spheres of influence. "The rules of the game have changed," said 
a ministry official. "The Cold War is now not so much an ideological 
conflict as one of national interests. It is possible that at some 
point there will be a mutual agreement based on a balance of forces, 
but it is hard to envisage its ever ending." The problem for 
Indonesia, as one general put it, is that in the absence of ideological 
conflict there is a greater danger that the powers will in fact suc­
ceed in reaching a mutual accommodation and will divide the world into
were somewhat more likely to see ideology as a diminishing force 
than were older ones. The 8 1928 Generation leaders were split 
evenly on the question, while 18 of 31 leaders from the 1945 Gener­
ation saw ideology declining in importance, as did 5 of 7 1966 
Generation leaders.
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spheres of influence. As long as the powers were motivated by 
global ideological aspirations, the possibility of such a de facto 
agreement, not to mention collusion among the powers, could safely 
be ruled out. Because of the decline of ideology, it is possible 
that Indonesia may face a more united front of big powers than 
would be conceivable were ideological conflicts a more potent 
force.
If the reduced importance of ideology as a factor in inter­
national relations has stimulated some fear that the big powers may 
agree to divide the world into spheres of influence, the growing 
commonality of interests between Washington and Moscow--the second 
major development seen as responsible for the diminution of the 
Cold War--provides even greater cause for such concern. The foreign 
policy elite seemed more impressed by the interests and character­
istics shared by the United States and the Soviet Union than by the 
points which separate them. They showed a strong tendency to lump 
the superpowers together.
To begin with, despite the almost universally strong anti­
communism of the foreign policy elite, there was near unanimity 
that Washington was just as much to blame for starting and ex­
acerbating the Cold War as Moscow; only the Muslim politicans felt 
that the Communists were primarily responsible for the conflict.8 
Although several Islamic leaders suggested that the west was "mere­
ly reacting defensively" in the face of "expansionist Marxist 
ideology," even among the Muslims there was some feeling that the 
west bore a share of responsibility for the conflict. In the 
words of a deeply anti-Communist leader of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), 
a primarily Java-based Islamic party:
Both sides are to blame. It is accurate enough to say 
that it was the Communist side that was on the offen­
sive while the west was trying to defend itself. That 
is natural because the Communists represent a new 
power while the old power resides in the west. The 
Communists asserted that they were morally right to re­
place the old power because of the injustice practiced 
by the imperialists. There is some truth in the Com­
munist view . . . the west cannot escape blame for the
Cold War because it was its own refusal to admit mistakes 
that lent some truth to the Communist allegations.
Among the rest of the foreign policy elite, the general view was 
that both superpowers, motivated either by ideology or by great 
power ambitions, aspired to control the rest of the world. There 
was remarkably little reticence even among some of the strongest 
anti-Communists to portray the United States as bent on world
8. Of 33 leaders, 85 percent felt that responsibility for the Cold 
War should be shared equally by both sides. While 4 out of 5 
Muslim leaders blamed the Communists for the Cold War and 1 of 
the 4 Catholic leaders did so, leaders of all the other groups 
were unanimous in asserting that both sides were equally respon­
sible. Three out of 7 1928 Generation leaders placed the blame 
on the Communists, while only 1 leader in the 1945 Generation 
and no 1966 Generation leaders did so.
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domination. For example, a strongly anti-Communist army officer, who 
had described the Cold War as a clash between two rival ideological 
systems seeking world domination, was asked whether he really meant 
to suggest that the United States wanted to dominate the world. He 
replied: MYes, of course it did.M For many, John Foster Dulles
symbolized the ideologically-based expansionism of the west; no 
figure of either side is seen as a more aggressive Cold War protagonist 
than he. Those who emphasized great power ambitions rather than 
ideology ascribed the Cold War to efforts by both the United States 
and the Soviet Union to fill the power vacuum left by World War II.
MBig powers always aim toward world hegemony--the first and second 
world wars started that way, and that is how the Cold War began,” 
asserted a former foreign minister. According to a current foreign 
ministry official, it was only after Mboth sides realized that the 
dangers and the costs were too high” that they gave up the attempt to 
control the world.
Particularly striking as a demonstration of the foreign policy 
elite’s tendency to lump the superpowers together despite their Cold 
War differences is the widespread feeling that the United States has 
more in common with the Soviet Union than with Indonesia and is better 
able to understand the Russians than to comprehend the Indonesians. 
Although the number of leaders with whom this question was discussed 
was relatively small, with only twenty-four respondents, a majority 
of the representatives of major groups did indicate their belief that 
the United States and the Soviet Union have more in common than the 
United States and Indonesia. This view was advanced namely by the 
young, by army, foreign ministry, and PSI leaders, and by pragmatists 
generally.
Many consider economic interests shared by the United States and 
the Soviet Union as advanced countries a key element in bringing the 
two superpowers closer together. According to one of President 
Suharto’s economic advisers, Washington and Moscow have come to see 
that they have many common interests, especially economic ones. "We 
see the Soviet Union as another advanced nation, as an oldefo, if 
you want to use that terminology," he declared. As one indication 
of the superpowers’ alignment on key economic issues, he pointed to 
the unwillingness of either Washington or Moscow to support the 
demands of the less developed countries in debates on trade terms 
within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). Indonesian leaders have also found their im­
pressions of the changed relationship between the superpowers confirmed 
by the encouragement American officials have given Djakarta to seek 
economic aid from and better relations with the Soviet Union.9 A PSI 
leader laid stress on the ability of the Soviets and the Americans, 
as economically advanced nations and world powers, to reach an accom­
modation on the differences between them:
The United States and the Soviet Union understand each 
other well, are able to think in the same terms as 
great powers, and are easily capable of cooperating to 
divide up the world into their respective spheres. They 
are capable of working out a . . . solid relationship
based on their mutual interests as equals. With respect
9. Reports of such encouragement came from cabinet level officials and 
were confirmed in talks with ranking American diplomats in Djakarta.
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to Indonesia, the relationship is very different because 
it is such an unequal one. . . .  We have nothing to of­
fer you, no bargaining position.
A leader with advanced education in the United States compared the 
problem of Indonesia's relations with the big powers to the diffi­
culties he experiences when he returns to his village in Central Java.
It is practically impossible, he noted, to communicate with former 
schoolmates who never went beyond secondary school. They simply don't 
think in the same terms as he does. The United States and the Soviet 
Union are like two rich men who speak the same language. "It is easier 
for two rich men, who speak the same jargon and have many similar inter­
ests, who understand each other, to work out a deal that will serve 
their mutual interests," he argued. "It is very hard for a rich man 
and a poor man to reach such an understanding. There is always 
suspicion and jealousy."
Others feel that cultural factors are as important as economic 
ones. To many Indonesians the USSR is essentially a European country, 
both racially and culturally. In the words of a PNI leader:
[The United States and the Soviet Union] are both white, 
developed countries. The US is closer to Russia than 
it is to Indonesia. I have been to Russia. Since Peter 
the Great they have wanted to be westernized. It is a 
western country. They have common standards with the 
US--they may be behind, trying to catch up, but they 
operate on the same standard. Not like China. Not like 
us. Our culture, our ways are different. . . .  It was 
perfectly natural for Nixon to say, as he did recently, 
that of all the countries he visited,10 1 he most appre­
ciated the reception he got in Rumania. Obviously, that 
is because Rumania is a European country.
Moreover, the tendency of the Indonesian leaders to perceive the 
US and the USSR in a similar light undoubtedly reflects the fact that 
Djakarta's relations with each of the superpowers focus on a number 
of common problems. In dealing with each superpower, the Indonesians 
feel they must find a way to draw material support without incurring 
excessive political risks. The same issues--debt repayments, terms of 
trade, conditions of aid, and the dangers of dependence--dominate 
Indonesia's relations with both Washington and Moscow.
The mutuality of interests between the Americans and the Soviets 
is seen as extending even to the possibility of joint military action 
against China. A majority of the Indonesian leaders, especially the 
younger ones, found a military confrontation between China and a 
Russian-American force a realistic possibility. Only an extremely 
small minority considered such an alignment inconceivable.11
10. Indonesia was one of the countries visited by Nixon on that trip.
11. Of 41 leaders, 10 percent considered such a confrontation likely, 
44 percent described it as possible, 32 percent as possible but 
unlikely, and only 14 percent as inconceivable. While 5 of 8 
1928 Generation leaders regarded such an alignment as either un­
likely or inconceivable and 11 of 24 leaders of the 1945 Genera­
tion took that position, only 3 of 9 1966 Generation leaders did 
so. There were no significant differences between pragmatists
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That those differences which remain between the United States 
and the Soviet Union are gradually becoming less significant is a 
widely held belief among members of the foreign policy elite. More 
than 70 percent expressed the view that•the United States and the 
Soviet Union are evolving in such a way that they will eventually 
possess similar systems. 2
Clearly, then, for the Indonesian foreign policy elite, differ­
ences between the major Cold War protagonists are growing increasingly 
blurred, though the Cold War conflict remains important. Reviewing 
the discussion of the Cold War as a whole, it is evident that the 
changed perception of it is especially pronounced among pragmatists, 
younger leaders, and certain of the major groups--notably the PSI, 
Catholics, army, technocrats and foreign ministry officials. The 
PNI and Islamic leaders stand together in viewing the Cold War as 
an undiminishing conflict based on the clash of ideologies. Table 4 
pres'ents a composite picture of the responses of each group to all 
of the questions on the Cold War, contrasting those who see the Cold 
War as a diminishing force in international relations against those 
who believe that there has been relatively little change in the Cold 
War's significance.
As the Cold War ideological conflict diminishes and the commonal­
ity of interests between Washington and Moscow grows, Indonesians find 
themselves freed of many of the pressures which in the 1950's left 
them with the feeling that they were beset by threats to their 
independence from both right and left. But, as suggested above in 
the discussion of the decline of ideology as a force in international 
relations, the diminution of competition between the superpowers has 
the effect of reducing the protection which a balancing of Indonesia's 
relations with the Cold War protagonists could provide. There is now 12
and ideologues on this issue. Among the major groups, an American- 
Soviet alliance against China was seen as not unlikely by 5 of 7 
PNI leaders, 2 of 3 technocrats, and 3 of 5 Catholics. In dis­
agreement with that judgement were all 4 foreign ministry 
officials, 4 of 5 Islamic leaders, and 3 of 5 from the army and 
from the PSI. The only leaders to describe such a confrontation 
as inconceivable were 2 Catholics and 1 from the PNI.
12. This question was discussed by 32 leaders, of whom 72 percent saw 
the United States and the Soviet Union evolving toward a similar 
system, with 22 percent in disagreement, and 6 percent unclear 
on the matter. The pragmatists were overwhelmingly in agreement 
on the existence of this trend, with 15 out of 18 taking that 
position. The 10 ideologues divided with 4 in agreement, 5 not, 
and 1 unclear. The two younger generations were somewhat more 
likely to perceive an evolution toward a similar system, with 
the 1928 Generation showing 4 of 6 in agreement, while the 1945 
Generation had 14 out of 19 in agreement, and the 1966 Generation 
had 5 out of 7 in agreement. Of the major groups, only the PSI 
was predominantly in disagreement, with 2 of 3 taking that posi­
tion. All 3 technocrats agreed that the United States and the 
Soviet Union are approaching each other, as did 3 of 4 Catholics,
3 of 4 foreign ministry officials, 2 of 3 PNI leaders, 3 of 5 
from the army, and 3 of 5 Islamic leaders.
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Table 4
Composite Picture of Attitudes Toward the Cold War
(in percentages)
Answers indicating 
that the Cold War is 
a diminishing force
Answers suggesting the 
continued importance 
of Cold War divisions
By Age Groups
1928 Generation (n*=51) 41 59
1945 Generation (n=164) 53 47
1966 Generation (n=47) 57 43
By Major Groups
PSI (n=28) 75 25
Catholic Party (n=27) 70 30
Army (n=35) 66 34
Technocrats (n=27) 63 37
Foreign Ministry (n=30) 53 47
PNI (n=40) 35 65
Islamic Parties (n=36) 28 72
Ideologues vs. Pragmatists
Ideologues (n=54) 30 70
Pragmatists (n=69) 58 42
* In this table, "n" refers to the number of answers on all the Cold
War questions.
a danger that the superpowers may cooperate in pursuing complementary 
economic interests in dealing with an economically underdeveloped and 
weak Indonesia. Moreover, the resurgent role of the Japanese, who 
are capable of working together with both the Americans and the Rus­
sians, exacerbates an already dangerous situation. Only China is 
clearly unable to cooperate with the other major powers in dealing 
with Indonesia. But since the Chinese threat, largely one of sub­
version through the PKI and, in the view of many Indonesian leaders, 
the overseas Chinese, is basically different in kind, there is lit­
tle possibility of balancing the Chinese threat against that 
emanating from the other three powers. Thus, the Indonesians, once 
confronted by two major threats which, in the context of Cold War 
competition, they could balance off against each other, now face a 
host of potentially exploitative powers, most of whom are seen as 
capable of cooperating to divide up the spoils of Indonesia. The 
real danger in the Cold War as it is increasingly perceived--as a 
competition among the great powers for spheres of influence in 
Indonesia-- is that it may not be a competition at all.
The Sino-Soviet Dispute
In the last years of Sukarno's rule, the Sino-Soviet dispute 
was important to the Indonesians for two main reasons: it symbolized
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the conflict between radical and moderate approaches to changing the 
international status quo, and it complicated Indonesian relations 
with the Communist powers. By 1963 Indonesian foreign policy had 
taken as one of its chief goals the leadership of those Asian and 
African nations that argued the need for a radical, confrontative 
approach. In that effort, Peking was Djakarta’s principal ally. The 
Chinese encouraged the Indonesians in their confrontation against 
Malaysia and applauded Sukarno’s withdrawal from the United Nations 
and his effort to establish CONEFO. The Soviets, on the other hand, 
came increasingly into conflict with the Chinese within the framework 
of the Asian-African solidarity movement and came to be identified 
with India as spokesmen for a view which emphasized peaceful co­
existence rather than confrontation against imperialism. Disagree­
ments between the Chinese and the Russians and their respective sup­
porters threatened to disrupt several of the Asian-African meetings 
and were seen by the Indonesians as a serious obstacle to Asian- 
African solidarity. Moreover, Moscow cautioned Indonesia against 
excesses in its confrontation against Malaysia and expressed no en­
thusiasm for Djakarta’s bolting of the United Nations and plans for 
CONEFO. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Sukarno found that close 
relations with Peking could be maintained only at the cost of a 
deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union. If the Sino-Soviet 
dispute symbolized alternative approaches and complicated international 
relations for Sukarno, it did the same for the PKI. The PKI followed 
a domestic course closer to that recommended by Moscow, but essen­
tially chose the side of Peking in the international relations aspects 
of the dispute. The PKI’s identification with Peking, it is safe 
to assume, contributed to the cooling of relations between the Soviet 
and the Indonesian governments.
The Sino-Soviet dispute today is viewed primarily as a great 
power struggle between two nations that represent potential threats 
to Indonesia. Sino-Soviet rivalry no longer poses a problem for 
the Indonesians, with Sino-Indonesian relations in suspension, the 
Asian-African solidarity movement a matter of little concern, and 
the PKI in ruins. In fact, it is generally seen as enhancing Indo­
nesia’s security. Practically all of the members of the foreign 
policy elite agreed that the significance of the Sino-Soviet dispute 
for Indonesia is that it reduces the capacity of the Communist powers 
to endanger Indonesia’s security in the near future and thus buys 
time for Indonesia to strengthen itself. One foreign ministry official 
noted that theoretically Indonesia would like to see all disputes 
settled peacefully, but Mrealistically we realize that the Sino- 
Soviet dispute benefits us.” Another foreign ministry official 
asserted that he could easily imagine the Sino-Soviet dispute coming 
to open warfare, which ’’from our standpoint, speaking frankly . . . 
would not be a bad thing . . . because this would mean it would take 
them time to rebuild . . . and this would give us a breathing spell.
You must not forget that there are still followers of both Peking 
and Moscow in Indonesia.” Others expressed some skepticism about the 
seriousness of the dispute. Most of the leaders (70 percent) 
described the dispute as essentially a conflict of national interests 
among two great powers, and this view led some, especially among the 
Islamic party leaders, to express the fear that it might be patched 
up. As one Islamic leader put it: ’’[The Sino-Soviet dispute] is
not a real dispute . . . because it is not an ideological dispute.” 
While both were described as ’’egoist” powers motivated by national 
ambitions to lead the international Communist movement, the lack of 
any ideological dispute was seen as easing the way toward a recon­
ciliation. Others suggested that China and Russia presently have
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conflicting national interests mainly because they are at different 
stages of economic development. But whatever the basis of the 
dispute, there was broad agreement that both China and the Soviet 
Union have ambitions which pose a threat to Indonesian independence, 
and there was virtual unanimity that the Sino-Soviet dispute weakens 
the threat from the Communist powers because it precludes their 
cooperation.
The Middle East Conflict
Under Sukarno, Indonesia outspokenly supported the Arabs in 
their conflict with Israel. Strong assertions of sympathy for th$ 
Arabs were even backed by action when Indonesia excluded Israel 
from the Asian Games held in Djakarta in 1962, thus precipitating 
an acrimonious conflict between Djakarta and the International 
Olympics Committee. For Sukarno Israel was an outpost of western 
imperialism in the Asian-African world. Since Sukarno’s removal 
from power, Indonesian support for the Arabs has been less pro­
nounced. Mild verbal support, mostly in the form of agreement with 
United Nations resolutions and expressions of concern over incidents 
such as the burning of the A1 Aqsha mosque, has continued. But 
few presently see the Middle East conflict as impinging directly 
on Indonesia’s national interests. Despite Djakarta’s official 
sympathy for the Arabs, 61 percent of the foreign policy elite 
members with whom the Middle East was discussed made it clear that 
they really feel little sympathy for the Arabs. There are, how­
ever, two groups which identify strongly with the Arabs and see 
Indonesia’s interests as served by a stronger pro-Arab posture.
Their perspectives on the Middle East conflict, along with those 
of the more apathetic majority, add an additional dimension to our 
understanding of the foreign policy elite’s assumptions about the 
nature of the international system.
Curiously, the Muslim party leaders and the PNI, two groups 
usually at odds with each other, find themselves in unacknowledged 
alignment in their mutual desire for more outspoken support of the 
Arabs. All of those who asserted that Indonesia’s support for the 
Arabs was too weak were either PNI leaders, navy officers identified 
with the PNI viewpoint, or Islamic party leaders. Although a few 
isolated voices have mentioned casually the hope that Indonesia 
might send volunteers to aid the Arabs, virtually no one takes this 
seriously. The principal step urged by those who feel Indonesia 
should strengthen its support of the Arabs is the granting of per­
mission to A1 Fatah to open a mission in Djakarta, similar to the 
representation accorded national liberation fronts of Vietnam and, 
previously, Algeria. Of the 15 leaders who argued that A1 Fatah 
should be permitted to open representation in Djakarta, a step 
which the government has thus far failed to allow,13 all but two
13. For an official government statement indicating the govern­
ment’s reservations about the validity of A1 Fatah’s claims 
to represent the Palestinian people, see Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik’s statement reported in Abadi, May 1, 1969. Indonesian 
Muslims were especially upset by the government’s refusal to 
grant visas to A1 Fatah representatives who had been permitted 
to observe the final plenary session of an international Islafiiic 
conference held in Kuala Lumpur.
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were identified with either a PNI or a Muslim point of view.
Of course, this coincidence of views between the Muslims and 
the PNI rests on two essentially different perceptions of the con­
flict. The PNI sees anti-imperialism as the central issue, and the 
whole Middle East conflict is interpreted as further evidence that 
imperialism still threatens the newly independent countries. Israel 
is regarded as a white, western creation, an American outpost in 
the Middle East and, somehow, an agent in the exploitation of the 
Middle East by Western oil interests. PNI leaders asserted that 
Indonesia's support of the Arabs has weakened because of the govern­
ment's concern about maintaining good relations with its western 
creditors, especially the United States. Some agreed that the need 
for western aid precluded stronger support for the Arabs, much as 
they resented such pressures. As one PNI leader put it:
If we displease the west, then we will jeopardize our 
sources of aid. Without foreign aid, we can't do 
anything in regard to development. $500 or $600 
million--where would we get that kind of money? We 
know that the Jews are in control of the economy 
in the United States, in West Germany, and France-- 
actually in practically all of the IGGI countries.
Others argued vigorously that Indonesia should not allow its dependence 
on foreign aid to prevent its taking a more active role in the Middle 
East. Even some leaders not associated with the PNI revealed a 
tendency to view the Middle East issue in terms of imperialism. In 
the words of one young leader generally regarded as PSI-ish: "I see
the Middle East issue not as Arab or Muslim versus Jew but as a 
colonial issue. That is, immigrants from the United States, Western 
and Eastern Europe have come in and colonized the Arabs living there 
before." Indonesians from practically all groups expressed concern 
about the plight of the Arab refugees. Thus for the PNI and to a 
lesser extent for others, the Middle East conflict symbolizes imper­
ialism at two levels--in Israel's status as a western economic out­
post in the Arab world and in the perceived western economic pres­
sures which have led Indonesia to moderate the outspoken support it 
gave the Arabs under Sukarno.
The Muslims see the Arab-Israeli dispute primarily as a situation 
requiring Islamic unity; for example, the burning of the A1 Aqsha 
mosque was denounced as an "insult to all Muslims." Occasionally, 
they even speak of a holy war in the Middle East. Although their 
principal basis for identification with the Arabs is Islam, the 
Muslim leaders do cite some additional considerations as justification 
for their view. They refer to a debt to the Arabs stemming from their 
support of Indonesia during the revolution, when certain Arab states 
gave recognition to Indonesian diplomatic missions. The refugee 
problem is often mentioned, with one leader contending that a religious 
state which "just throws out residents because they have a different 
religion" is "archaic" and should not be permitted to exist. More­
over, though they perceive the Middle East conflict as a matter of 
religious solidarity rather than anti-imperialism, there is evidence 
that many of the Islamic party leaders strongly resent both the 
western role in the Middle East and the western economic pressures 
which preclude Indonesia's giving stronger support to the Arabs.
Like the PNI, the Muslims view the Middle East conflict, to some 
extent, as an aspect of Indonesia's relations with the United States.
If the activities of Christian missionaries in Indonesia, whom they
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see as supported by the United States, make the Muslim leaders un­
easy about their country's economic dependence on the Judaeo- 
Christian west, the Middle East conflict and Indonesia's muted sup­
port for the Arabs serve as another reminder of that unpleasant 
dependence. Though some Muslim leaders have an inclination to be 
favorably disposed toward the west because of a shared antipathy 
toward Communism, the Middle East conflict makes them wary of the 
west. To the extent that the Muslim leaders see the outside world 
as hostile, the Middle East conflict contributes substantially to 
that perception.
For most of the other members of the foreign policy elite, the 
Middle East dispute is simply a conflict among distant nations in 
which there is some sympathy for the Arabs because of Israel's alleged 
mistreatment of Palestinian refugees, but also a good deal of contempt 
for the-Arabs' incompetence and suspicion about their flirtation with 
the Russians. In foreign ministry, army, PSI, technocrat, and 
Catholic circles, there is a very widespread feeling that a "rational" 
policy for Indonesia would be to view the Middle East conflict not 
as a religious matter but as an issue between the Arab nations and 
Israel. While almost no one criticizes the present policy of "lip- 
service support" for the Arabs, there is practically unanimous agree­
ment that the Arabs are unrealistic to think of destroying Israel.
As one general put it: "It doesn't make any sense for [the Arabs]
to talk about destroying Israel. Israel is a fact, it exists, and 
is recognized by the world." Many pictured the Arabs as bumblers, 
alluding to their inability even to agree among themselves. One 
newspaper editor told of being approached by Arab embassies at the 
time of the six-day war. He recalled that the Arabs had asked him 
to report the war as a defeat for the Israelis. He refused, and 
instead ridiculed the Arabs for their incompetence. "If Indonesians 
had been given such equipment, we could have fought a real war," 
he asserted. The Arabs' generally negative image is reinforced by 
animosities toward the Arab minority in Indonesia and, according to 
some, by a belief that the Arab leaders are unreliable allies. 
Rebutting the contention that Djakarta owes the Arabs firm support 
out of a sense of indebtedness for Arab backing during the Indonesian 
revolution, several leaders recalled that when Indonesia's banning 
of Israel from the Asian Games led to a conflict with the Interna­
tional Olympics Committee resulting in Djakarta's withdrawal from 
the Olympics, the Arabs refused to join Indonesia in leaving the 
Olympics. Inasmuch as Djakarta's action was considered to be a move 
undertaken on behalf of the Arabs, their failure to share in the 
consequences was portrayed as proof of their untrustworthiness.
There is, in fact, a good deal of sympathy for Israel, though 
it is almost never expressed publicly. Especially among army 
officers, PSI leaders, and technocrats, there is admiration for 
Israel's economic and military achievements. Several went so far as 
to mention Israel as the country which provides the best model for 
Indonesia.1*' One army leader put it this way:
When we speak privately among ourselves, we cannot help 
admiring what the Israelis have done, though we feel 
bound to support the Arabs. We do feel it was wrong to 14
14. This was in response to a question which asked what country, if 
any, constituted the best model for Indonesia.
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establish Israel, but that question aside, they have 
provided an excellent example of what a nation can 
do by its own hard work. They have done a marvelous 
job of economic development. And their concept of 
the citizen-soldier is very impressive. Every 
citizen is also a soldier, and every soldier is also 
a citizen, a contributing citizen. . . . True, a good 
deal of money is channeled to Israel from private 
citizens in the United States, but the Israelis have 
managed to defend themselves and develop their country 
largely by their own efforts--by self-reliance.
Suspicion about the Arabs1 dependence on Communist aid is strong­
est in the army, but others, including even some Muslims, expressed 
their concern. One general defended the limiting of Indonesia's 
support for the Arabs by emphasizing Communist influence in the 
Middle East:
It is a regrettable fact that Soviet, and even Chinese, 
influence has penetrated so deep among the Arabs that 
they are no longer independent. Look at Egypt. You 
cannot say they are independent. Look at Syria.
It is sad that those nations have become victims of 
the Cold War.
A1 Fatah representation in Indonesia, he added, would be "very danger­
ous," because Communist influence in the guerrilla group is great.
An A1 Fatah mission in Djakarta could cause great confusion and might 
provide a channel for the infiltration of Communist agents, he warned. 
Certain Arab embassies in Djakarta are already serving that purpose, 
it was alleged. Another general was worried that A1 Fatah representa­
tion in Djakarta might cause trouble "with those embassies here that 
support Israel." For example, they might try to blow up the embassy 
of Switzerland or the United States. "Why should we take a chance 
on inviting such trouble here?" he asked. Even among Muslims who 
lament Djakarta's timid support of the Arabs there is concern about 
Communist influence in the Middle East. An Islamic leader contended 
that some Arab countries, like Syria, cannot really be called Islamic; 
they are "secular, leftist." Although some Muslim leaders sought to 
minimize the implications of Communist influence in the Arab world 
and especially in A1 Fatah by pointing out that Communists have played 
a role in many national liberation movements, including Indonesia's, 
most were clearly uneasy about it, some to the point that they were 
not so sure about the advisability of allowing the guerrilla group 
representation in Djakarta.
Though clearly few outside the PNI and Islamic parties would be 
disposed to strengthen Indonesia's support for the Arabs even if 
Djakarta were not economically dependent on the west, economic con­
siderations do appear to constitute an element in their perception 
of the Middle East conflict. The PNI and Islamic leaders' contention 
that the government sees strong support of the Arabs as inconsistent 
with Indonesia's economic needs does not seem to be without basis.
For example, one technocrat stressed the need for an accommodation 
with Israel in order to facilitate the re-opening of the Suez Canal, 
thus expediting Indonesia's trade with Europe. Another official 
defended the diminution of Indonesia's support for the Arabs with the 
argument that "well-informed" Indonesians understood that their 
country's "real interests" demanded restraint on the Middle East, so 
as to avoid jeopardizing western aid sources.
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To summarize, the Middle East conflict is not a central concern 
for most Indonesian leaders, but those who do feel strongly reflect 
in their attitudes some basic presumptions about the nature of the 
international system. Those who sympathize strongly with the Arabs-- 
both the Muslims and the PNI--see in the Middle East conflict further 
evidence of efforts by the major powers to exploit the less developed 
countries for their own purposes. Though one group is motivated by 
a concern about religious solidarity and the other by anti-imperialism, 
both see the Israelis as essentially western intruders and the Arabs 
as victims of the extension of western influence in the Middle East.
And both portray Indonesia’s position on the Middle East issue as a 
reflection of pressures arising from their country’s economic de­
pendence on the west. Those who are cool toward the Arabs criticize 
them for having fallen victim to a dangerous dependence on the Com­
munist powers and admire Israel’s apparent success in developing it­
self economically and militarily without sacrificing its independence 
to the foreigners who lend support. Thus, practically all of the 
foreign policy elite see in the Middle East conflict small nations 
struggling to stay independent of the big powers.
The Nefos-Oldefos Conflict
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the foreign 
policy elite sees the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the 
Middle East conflict as increasingly peripheral to Indonesia’s 
interests. But each of those conflicts is taken by the Indonesian 
leaders as evidence that the international system is an essentially 
exploitative order in which powerful nations seek to dominate the 
weak. Cutting across the discussion of the several international 
conflicts is a tendency to emphasize the similarities rather than the 
differences among the big powers, and to lump together the rich, 
industrialized nations of the world as threatening the independence 
of the less developed, newly independent states. It is, therefore, 
by no means surprising that the concept of a conflict between nefos 
and oldefos, despite its identification with Sukarno, proved to be 
still widely accepted by the Indonesian leaders as the most meaning­
ful way to divide the world.
Sukarno’s formulation defined the nefos as the "progressive 
revolutionary" forces of the world, and he explicitly included the 
Soviet Union and "revolutionary elements" within industrialized 
western countries as nefos. Many of Indonesia’s present leaders 
have recast the nefos-oldefos conflict in more narrowly economic 
terms, preferring to speak less of ideology and more of a clash of 
interests between the rich nations and the poor nations of the world. 
Nearly 80 percent of the foreign policy elite saw truth in one defini­
tion or another of the nefos-oldefos formulation. A similarly over­
whelming majority, when asked which of the several conflicts dis­
cussed was most important from Indonesia’s standpoint, chose the 
nefos-oldefos conflict, though roughly half of those who did so 
disdained use of the Sukarno terminology.15 Young and old, 
ideologues and pragmatists, and all the major groups except the 
Islamic party leaders showed broad agreement on the truth of the 
formulation (see Table 5).
15. Of 23 leaders, 78 percent chose the nefos-oldefos conflict as the 
most significant one for Indonesia, while 13 percent mentioned 
the Cold War and 9 percent the Sino-Soviet dispute.
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Table 5
Agreement With the Nefos-Oldefos Concept as 
a Description of the International System
It Contains It Contains
Truth (Much) Essentially
No Truth
By Age Groups
1928 Generation 7 (5) 21945 Generation 28 (16) 9
1^66 Generation 8 (2) 1
By Major Groups
PNI 8 (8) 0Army 7 (3) 1Foreign Ministry 6 (2) 1PSI 6 (2) 1Catholic Party 4 (0) 1Technocrats 5 (2) 2Islamic Parties 2 (2) 4
Ideologues vs. Pragmatists
Ideologues 14 (ID 6Pragmatists 20 (9) 4
All Foreign Policy Elite 43 (23) 12
At the same time, the foreign policy elite's discussion of the 
nefos-oldefos dichotomy suggested a degree of ambivalence stemming 
largely from the contradictory pressures bearing on the Indonesian 
leaders. Those who embraced the nefos-oldefos idea with greatest 
enthusiasm tended to be older men, ideologues, and PNI leaders, which 
probably reflects the fact that those groups are the least reticent 
about being linked with Sukarno and his ideas. Others conceded the 
validity of the nefos-oldefos dichotomy as a description of interna­
tional realities, but were clearly uneasy about the implications of 
that perspective. Especially among those directly responsible for 
Indonesia1svaid-oriented foreign policy, enthusiasm for the nefos- 
oldefos idea was moderated by a feeling that they cannot afford to 
assume that the powerful nations with which Indonesia must deal will 
remain unalterably exploitative. Many who acknowledged the exploita­
tive aims of the big powers insisted that Indonesia must nevertheless 
continue to seek areas of cooperation with the powers in the hope that 
they can be persuaded to accept the desirability of development in 
the less developed countries. Though most see exploitative motivations 
dominant in the industrialized powers, they maintain that Indonesians 
ncannot afford to be pessimistic.”
For some of the Indonesian leaders, the nefos-oldefos dichotomy 
still suggests a broad effort by the powerful nations to use their 
political, military, and economic might to keep the poor nations from
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advancing along an independent course. A few emphasized their 
conviction that the oldefos are motivated by racism and the 
arrogance that derives from being an established power. In the 
words of one PNI leader: "The rich-poor conflict really comes
down to the racist, superior attitude of the west. . . . You see 
it everywhere, this attitude of racial superiority. They really 
recognize only three Asian countries as civilized--China, India, and 
now Japan. . . . World problems will never be solved until the 
west gets rid of its attitude of racial superiority/1 Another 
leader, who was in the United States at the time of the 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis, recalled that even anti-Communist Indonesians were 
inclined to side with Cuba, which they saw as a small country 
threatened by the United States. Others argued that Indonesia’s 
"concrete experience" offered ample evidence of the unwillingness 
of the powers to refrain from efforts to keep Indonesia down, 
and they pointed to instances of both western and Communist inter­
vention in Indonesia’s internal affairs. Some leaders claimed 
that the basic truth of the nefos-oldefos idea is borne out by 
great power domination of the United Nations, as represented 
especially by their veto power in the Security Council. In the 
words of one cabinet minister, the UN is "run by the oldefos, 
just as Sukarno said." CONEFO, he claimed, was a brilliant idea 
because it reflected an accurate perception of the real situation 
in the world, but "the world simply was not ready for it yet."
The point, in the words of a PNI leader, is that the world "really 
is divided up that way--with the nefos trying to rise, and the 
oldefos trying to keep them down, to keep them dependent." 
Colonialism, "in the old form, not to mention the new, still 
exists in the world." Even many nefo countries are victims of 
neo-colonialism--that is to say, they "actually are controlled by 
oldefos," and their leaders "carry out the bidding of oldefo 
leaders who operate behind the scenes," a foreign ministry official 
pointed out. Neo-colonialism can only be overcome, it is argued, 
through united action by the oppressed.
But political and military pressures are generally seen as 
less dangerous today than economic ones. The most widespread 
basis for agreement with the nefos-oldefos concept as a description 
of the international system is the belief that the industrialized 
nations of the world do not genuinely desire the economic develop­
ment of the less developed; on the contrary, the advanced nations 
are seen as in one degree or another preferring the economic sub­
jugation of nations like Indonesia, so that the latter might be 
made to serve as sources of raw materials and markets for the sur­
plus production of the industrialized states. Of course, the danger 
of economic exploitation was an important part of the nefos-oldefos 
idea, even as enunciated by Sukarno. As one leader close to the 
former President put it: "[The nefos-oldefos concept] was meant to
refer to the conflict between the haves and have-nots--actually 
between the exploiters and the exploited." For Sukarno, and for 
many of the ideologues in the foreign policy elite, this conflict 
is an inevitable product of the existence of an international system 
dominated by capitalism. But even many of those who consider them­
selves pragmatists find that their personal experiences have left 
them with the suspicion that the industrialized nations have not 
abandoned the goal of economic exploitation that led to colonialism 
in the first place.
Those directly involved at the highest levels in the formula­
tion and implementation of Indonesia’s aid-oriented policy see the
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relationship with the aid-giving countries as essentially confronta- 
tive, not cooperative. In negotiations concerning the terms of trade, 
aid, and investment, they have repeatedly encountered evidence of 
the unwillingness of the industrialized countries to help the less 
developed. A cabinet minister spoke for other top officials when he 
expressed doubt that the rich countries want the poor ones to advance. 
Several of Indonesia's technocrats emphasized that the relationship 
between the developing and the advanced countries is a confrontative 
one. As one of them put it:
I think it is accurate to say that there is a basic con­
flict of interest between the advanced countries and 
the developing countries. It is not basically a coopera­
tive relationship. For example, look at the UNCTAD 
sessions, in which it has proved impossible to reach 
agreement. Or look at the recommendation that the 
advanced countries give 1 percent of their GNP in 
aid--only a very few have met this standard. One 
more example--the recent decision by the United 
States to release its rubber stockpile is a severe 
blow to us. Whether it is for economic or political 
reasons, it is clear that there is a real conflict, 
a real clash between the advanced countries and the 
developing countries. . . .  It is definitely necessary 
for the developing countries to join together and 
struggle against the advanced ones to promote the 
common interests of the developing countries.
Foreign ministry officials argued vigorously that the industrialized 
countries want the developing countries to produce only raw materials. 
In the words of one:
Nobody wants to develop industries in another country 
that will compete with their own. If people here 
say they think other countries are interested in 
seeing Indonesia develop such industries, it is 
because they feel they must say that. But you can­
not take such words at face value. The aid-giving 
countries are only after their own interests. They 
aid Indonesia because they expect to gain certain 
political or economic goals and not for any other 
reason.
Even some of Sukarno's bitterest opponents, who scorned the nefos- 
oldefos idea as sloganeering and dismissed it as Marxist cant, did 
not hesitate to assert the confrontative character of the relationship 
between the rich and the poor countries. For example, one who 
declared that he had no sympathy for the nefos-oldefos idea, however 
defined, went on to argue that the "advanced countries must come to 
realize that it is in their own interests to help the developing 
countries, and they must give up their ideas of trying to use aid to 
establish a new form of colonialism or imperialism, or merely to 
extend their economic influence."
Numerous arguments are made to substantiate the view that trade, 
aid, and investment are being used by the industrialized nations to 
subjugate the developing countries. With respect to trade, a general 
trend of rising prices for the industrial goods they buy and falling 
prices for the raw materials they sell has given many Indonesian
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leaders the feeling that they are being exploited. Moreover, this 
trend is viewed as the result of a conscious exertion of power by 
the advanced countries, which are pictured as concerned mainly 
about the size of their profits. As a foreign ministry official put 
it: "The rich countries are too heavily motivated by the short­
term needs of their industrialists, which inevitably leads them to 
a position which is not beneficial to us." The advanced countries, 
it is said, have repeatedly sought in international conferences and 
in negotiations on particular commodities to force down prices on 
Indonesian exports. A great many Indonesian leaders have been 
deeply impressed by the unwillingness of the industrialized countries 
to agree to an easing of trade terms within the framework of the 
UNCTAD discussions. In the two UNCTAD meetings, held in 1964 and 
1968, the western industrial powers stood against the bloc of 77 
less developed countries, with the Soviet Union adopting a neutral 
stance, which the Indonesian leaders tend to interpret as de facto 
opposition. Like the PNI leader who pointed to the UNCTAD conferences 
and asked how anyone could say the world is no longer divided into 
blocs, many Indonesian leaders see those meetings as a graphic demon­
stration of the reality of the nefos-oldefos conflict. Another 
example cited by the Indonesians is the tariff system maintained by 
the European Common Market, which they find very damaging.16 And 
when the Indonesians see the United States dumping its rubber and 
tin on the world market with serious consequences for Indonesia, 
they find still further evidence that they are being exploited by 
the powerful industrialized countries.17
The fact that some industrialized nations give aid to the less 
developed countries and invest their capital in them is by no means 
taken as proof that they genuinely desire economic development in 
the poor countries. Many of those who emphasized the validity of 
the nefos-oldefos dichotomy see aid and investment as a potential 
bridge to domination. The United States1 relationship with Latin
16. The Indonesians are especially concerned about the 10 percent 
duty imposed by the Common Market on Indonesian pepper. This 
concern emerged sharply in Harian Kami, July 10, 1970. That 
newspaper, which represents the anti-Sukarno 1966 Generation 
leaders, editorially accused the "six rich countries" of the 
Common Market of establishing high tariff walls "to strike a 
blow at our exports and those of other developing countries."
The Common Market countries1 policy of "enriching themselves 
is implemented by ’killing1 the economy of the developing 
countries," asserted the editorial. See also Harian Kami,
July 13, 1970.
17. The United States’ decision in mid-1970 to release its rubber 
and tin stockpiles on the world market evoked expressions of ex­
treme dismay from several leading technocrats, as reported in 
the press. One was quoted to the effect that Indonesia’s loss 
would exceed the amount of aid given by the United States.
Harian Kami wrote editorially that the rich western countries 
appeared to be more concerned with their own economic growth and 
prosperity than with helping the developing countries. Although 
they give aid to the developing countries, they extract much 
more; the "morality of the rich countries," concluded Harian 
Kami, is "give 1/2, get back 3/4." See Harian Kami, July 10, 
1970 and July 17, 1970; and Ekspres, July 26, 1970.
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America is widely viewed as an example of the kind of danger facing 
all of the less developed countries. In Southeast Asia fears are 
focused on Japan. Many leaders, including the highly influential 
technocrats who formulate Indonesia's economic policies, have 
expressed the belief that the Japanese would like to exercise the 
kind of dominant influence in Southeast Asia that the United States 
has in Latin America. Washington's encouragement of the Japanese in 
the expansion of their international role only exacerbates that con­
cern. The point here is that the economic position which the Japanese 
are building through aid and investment is considered merely the local 
manifestation of a much more general problem facing the less developed 
countries.
In the first place, aid is sometimes obtainable only after acri­
monious bargaining which raises new suspicions about the motivations 
of the aid-giver. Secondly, a great many of those who see the nefos- 
oldefos division as crucial believe that western aid is conditional, 
either implicitly or explicitly, on the recipient's following certain 
economic policies. Especially where "banker's" institutions like the 
IMF are influential, aid tends to become contingent on the government's 
following stabilization-oriented policies, which many interpret as 
creating an ideal climate for foreign investment and the sale of the 
donor country's products through aid credits, but as seriously impeding 
the development of indigenous productive capacities. The majority of 
the foreign policy elite believe that aid is given mainly as a way of 
disposing of surplus production. As one leader put it: "The Japanese
have decided that they need countries like Indonesia to absorb their 
surplus. They are aware that buying power is very low here. So they 
give us credits to buy their products and call it aid." Foreign in­
vestors who extract a country's resources without building processing 
facilities and training indigenous personnel only provide further con­
firmation of the fear that aid and investment are being used as a 
means of exploitation.18
18. The foreign policy elite's discussion of Indonesia's aid relation­
ships and development strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but the views they express, which confirm the general skepticism 
about the motivations of the aid-giving countries suggested above, 
may be worth summarizing briefly here. More than 60 percent say 
that they are worried about Indonesia's dependence on foreign 
aid, and most of them admit to being seriously concerned. A 
similar percentage are fearful that foreign investment will gain 
so strong a position in Indonesia that it will jeopardize the 
country's independence. Even more widespread is the belief that 
the aid-giving countries have already attempted to attach "strings" 
to their aid. Some 80 percent are convinced that the industrialized 
countries assist Indonesia only to serve their own interests, main­
ly to secure markets for their surplus production. Only a third 
believe that the advanced countries will give wholehearted sup­
port to industrialization in Indonesia, and nearly half expect 
that they will give no help at all in that endeavor. Nearly 
two-thirds feel that Indonesia's development strategy is exces­
sively oriented to stabilization at the expense of increasing 
production, while a similar majority say that the IMF has been 
too influential in the formulation of those policies. More than 
90 percent express concern that the Japanese aspire to economic 
domination of Indonesia.
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If there is wide agreement on the existence of a conflict between 
the nefos and the oldefos, there is more limited acceptance of 
Sukarno’s recommendation that the nefos unite in struggling to over­
come the forces of exploitation. Slightly more than half agree with 
Sukarno that the nefos must actively confront the oldefos, though few 
would employ his uncompromisingly anti-imperialist rhetoric. As a 
PSI leader put it: "It is a struggle--the poor countries must try
to unite to force the rich ones to give them better terms. It is a 
mistake to expect, as we did in the UNCTAD meetings, that the rich 
will make concessions voluntarily." Leading technocrats have 
similarly affirmed the need for the nefos to seek a common front in 
dealing with the rich nations. The nefos must, in the words of an 
army general, "pool what bargaining power they have as a result of 
their possession of raw materials and try to better their common 
lot."
But others see such a struggle as futile. In their view, the 
poor countries are too weak and disunited to think of imposing any 
demands on the industrialized nations. "To talk of the nefos 
mobilizing and crushing the oldefos is unrealistic, nonsense," as­
serts one young leader who acknowledges the dichotomy's validity 
as a description of the international system. Conscious of the 
weakness of the nefos, most are pressimistic about their chances of 
bringing about any major changes in the nature of the international 
system. More than half indicated their belief that the gap between 
the rich and the poor nations is growing wider. As an army general 
put it: "The rich get richer, and the poor have more children. The
rich nations are moving ahead at 50 kilometers, we are moving at 20-- 
how are we going to catch up? It's impossible." Even the economists 
responsible for Indonesia's development plan talk not of catching 
up but merely of trying to move ahead. For some members of the 
foreign policy elite pessimism borders on despair. As one PSI 
leader put it: "We are so weak that it is unrealistic to talk
about a conflict between the poor and rich. . . . There is a good 
chance that the industrialized countries will simply decide to ig­
nore the poor countries, to let us stew in our own juices. Perhaps 
the prediction of Marx will come true--we will just wither away, 
cease to exist." Washington's mid-1970 decision to release its rub­
ber and tin stockpiles evoked a rare public expression of despair 
from a newspaper representing the anti-Sukarno, 1966 Generation 
students:
It is truly dishonorable to rely on the pity of others.
To form a bloc to challenge the strong countries is not 
quite realistic. . . . This helplessness is bitter in­
deed. It often stirs radical-revolutionary thinking in 
us for what use is the slogan 'stability and security 
and peace in Southeast Asia' when we are being treated 
arbitrarily. . . . People are tired of begging. . . ,19
But many Indonesian leaders, especially those with direct re- 
sponsility for the making and implementation of policies, voiced 
the belief that they simply cannot afford to be pessimistic about 
the possibilities of resolving differences between the rich nations 
and the poor. To assume that no compromise is possible would be 
self-destructive, they feel. Though it is valid, as a Christian
19. Harian Kami, July 17, 1970.
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leader put it, to say that the world must be changed before nations 
like Indonesia can develop, it is also necessary "to realize prag­
matically that we are too weak--we will fail--and thus we must try 
to work with elements in the advanced countries that are sympathetic" 
to the needs of the poor nations. The outlook is not promising, 
but the attempt must be made, he contends. An economic official, 
noting the futility of talk about confronting the advanced countries, 
concluded: "The only thing for us to do is to try to work out
compromises in a businesslike way with the advanced countries. For 
example, if the Common Market countries want to have high tariffs, 
then we say, all right, but then you should give us aid in such and 
such a form." Indonesia must seek to "eliminate the areas of con­
flict and build on the possibilities for cooperation," as an army 
general put it. Several leaders suggested that countries like 
Indonesia might do better to seek concessions from the advanced 
countries on an individual basis, rather than through multilateral 
conferences and other forms of joint action. Whereas from an economic 
standpoint the less developed countries have a weak bargaining posi­
tion, "political considerations," it was felt, might lead the indus­
trialized nations to make concessions they would not otherwise 
consider.
Those who completely rejected the nefos-oldefos dichotomy as a 
description of international realities emphasized a number of points, 
most of which also figured to some degree in the thinking of leaders 
who basically accepted the nefos-oldefos idea. A few dismissed the 
whole idea as meaningless Sukarno propaganda. One technocrat sug­
gested that the former President simply felt he had to have some 
concept he could call his own, so he contrived the nefos-oldefos idea. 
Others found the nefos-oldefos dichotomy repugnant because they re­
gard it as a Marxist conception likely to lead Indonesia into an overly 
close association with the Communist powers. Several expressed the 
fear that a movement on the part of the less developed countries to 
confront the industrialized nations would naturally lead them into 
alignment with Peking as the leader of the nefos. Though most were 
inclined to regard the Soviet Union as an oldefo, there were a few 
who thought that because the Soviets want to keep the rich western 
countries from getting too far ahead there was a danger that Moscow 
too might end up leading the nefos. Others dissented in particular 
from what they see as the Marxist perspective which holds that 
economic differences necessarily mean conflict. They argue that there 
is a "difference" but not a "conflict" between the rich and the poor 
nations; it is possible to have parallel development with all 
benefiting. Moreover, if the advanced countries help the less 
developed, suggested one army general, "they know we will feel in­
debted to them."
The most widespread objection to the nefos-oldefos idea was the 
belief that the advanced nations are in fact becoming increasingly 
aware that it is in their interests to foster development in countries 
like Indonesia. Army generals, technocrats, PSI leaders, and Islamic 
leaders are among those who say they see "encouraging signs" that the 
industrialized countries will help the poor develop. The Pearson 
Report and the increasingly prominent role of organizations like the 
World Bank are cited as evidence of a growing awareness of the need 
to reduce differences between the rich and poor nations. The in­
dustrialized countries realize, it is said, that a developed, 
prosperous Indonesia will be a better market for their products than 
one in which buying power remains low. Besides, added one PSI leader, 
without aid from the advanced countries there will be no development,
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and without development there will be no peace in Southeast Asia.
The major powers will do what they must to prevent the further 
outbreak of war in this region, he predicted. There are certainly 
conflicts of interest, it is conceded, but that does not mean that 
the relationship between the rich and poor countries is essentially 
confrontative. As one foreign ministry official put it: "Sure
there are some short-sighted people who resist giving favorable 
terms . . .  to the developing countries because of short-term 
economic interests, but essentially the developed countries are 
aware that it,is in their own interests to help us develop.”
These criticisms of the nefos-oldefos concept, however, repre­
sent a minority viewpoint. For the foreign policy elite as a whole, 
the nefos-oldefos dichotomy remains an accurate description of inter 
national,realities. Most of the Indonesian leaders do see the out­
side world as essentially a hostile place. It needs to be borne in 
mind, of course, that the perception of hostility is not unambiguous 
Besides illuminating the thinking of those who reject the nefos- 
oldefos dichotomy, the criticisms of that concept suggest some of 
the ambivalence and inconsistency found in the majorityTs perception 
of the outside world as hostile. Moreover, the previous discussion 
of the problem of cooperation among the nefos suggests another 
important qualification. The Indonesian leaders see the interna­
tional system as dominated by the big powers, and they tend to see 
the big powers as hostile; thus, the outside world is seen as a 
place in which the dominant forces are ones that seek to subjugate 
Indonesia. But this of course does not mean that all of the forces 
in the outside world are seen as hostile. Far from considering the 
other nefos a threat,20 the Indonesian leaders generally see 
Djakarta as the natural leader of Southeast Asia and a major force 
in the Asian-African world. Still, though this simultaneous fear 
of exploitation by the big powers and self-confidence vis-a-vis 
the other less developed countries may heighten the ambivalence of 
Indonesian leaders as they face the outside world, it does not 
alter the fact that from their standpoint the predominant forces 
beyond Indonesian borders are hostile. Clearly, despite their 
many disagreements with Sukarno, the essential perception of the 
international system as an exploitative order is unchanged.
Implications for Indonesian Foreign 
Policy of Development
If the foreign policy elite's basic assumptions about the na­
ture of the international system suggest a conviction that the 
outside world is a hostile place, their attitudes concerning 
Indonesia's foreign aid relationships and development strategy, the 
meaning of an "independent and active” foreign policy, specific 
countries as potential threats to Indonesia's independence, and 
regional trends in Southeast Asia confirm the predominance of that 
underlying perception. In discussions of all those subjects, the 
hostile world perspective is evident in the thinking of both young 
and old, pragmatists and ideologues, and representatives of
20. An obvious exception is China, perceived as both a nefo and 
a great power--and definitely a threat.
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practically all of the major groups. Moreover, suspicion about the 
outside world is especially high among those with the most exposure 
to the world beyond Indonesia’s borders--that is, among those with 
a foreign education or extensive experience living and traveling 
abroad. 1 Given its bases, it seems fair to regard the perception 
of a hostile outside world as a continuing influence on Indonesian 
foreign policy.
But the fact remains that Indonesia's foreign policy is drastical­
ly different from what it was before 1966. Notwithstanding the pre­
valence of a view of the world which is essentially similar to that 
which underlay Sukarno's policies, Indonesia has clearly abandoned 
a confrontative foreign policy and is firmly committed to a foreign 
policy of development. The reasons why Indonesian foreign policy 
changed so dramatically in the middle 1960's are complex and really 
beyond- the scope of this paper, but it is necessary to say something 
of that process of change to understand the implications of the 
foreign policy elite's view of the world for the future of Indonesia's 
foreign policy of development.
The principal explanation of the change in Indonesian foreign 
policy lies in the relationship between elite attitudes and political 
structure. Because of the character of the Indonesian ruling elite 
and the nature of its power, there have been substantial incentives 
for Indonesia's leaders, both before and after 1966, to seek foreign 
aid. Neither the former nor the present leadership has possessed 
the political apparatus needed to raise domestically the resources 
for development. A Chinese Communist style mobilization of domestic 
resources is simply unthinkable for the Indonesian elite, because it 
lacks both the capacity and the will to implement such a coercive 
strategy. Sukarno's insistence on self-reliance really meant a 
downgrading of development, and former high officials in the Sukarno 
government are virtually unanimous in asserting that no one, not 
even Sukarno, ever really believed Indonesia could develop without 
foreign aid. That the present elite sees foreign aid as indispensable 
is manifest--78 percent asserted that development in Indonesia would 
be impossible without foreign aid. Moreover, foreign aid and invest­
ment present to those in power opportunities for personal profit, 
and some officials have been far from reluctant to take advantage 
of such opportunities.
Prior to 1966, however, the political risks of a development 
foreign policy were almost prohibitively high. The political system 
that prevailed in the early 1960's was competitive, in the sense 
that there were three real contenders for power--Sukarno, the army, 
and the PKI. Given the existence Of a widespread perception of the 
outside world as hostile, it is very hard to imagine that a foreign 
policy emphasizing primarily the search for aid and heavy reliance 
on foreign advice in the planning and execution of an economic 
stabilization program could have been adopted in a competitive 
political situation. The stabilization plan of 1963 drew opposition 
from practically every quarter; all of the political parties were 
critical, while the army leadership exhibited no enthusiasm for the 
plan. In the first place, stabilization, a precondition for economic 
aid from the West, required painful sacrifices on the part of many 21
21. The relationship between perceptions of hostility and exposure to 
the outside world is explored in some detail in my forthcoming 
Cornell Ph.D. dissertation.
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people; it is almost never a popular policy in any country, though 
it may be accepted as necessary. But beyond the difficulties inher­
ent in any stabilization program the widespread perception of a 
hostile world created particular dangers for advocates of a develop­
ment foreign policy. Anyone who might have dared to propose such a 
course would have immediately laid himself open to the accusation 
that he was selling out the country, making a mockery of independence, 
and lacking in nationalist spirit. Had any one of the major competi­
tors for power openly adovcated such a course, the result would have 
been to give its rivals an excellent opportunity to gain political 
advantage.
At the same time, the existence of a competitive political 
system created strong incentives for the Sukarno government to 
pursue a confrontative foreign policy, which could be portrayed 
as necessary to defend the nation's independence against perceived 
threats. In a competitive situation, given prevailing attitudes, 
a foreign policy emphasizing the need to defend Indonesia's inde­
pendence against external threats served a variety of political 
uses. For example, the policy of confrontation against Malaysia 
was used by all three of the chief political elements to legitimize 
domestic policies which each felt would enhance its political 
position vis-a-vis the others.
Once the political competition was resolved in favor of one 
of the contenders, as it was when the army came effectively to 
monopolize political power in 1966, the political attractions of 
a confrontative foreign policy became irrelevant. At the same 
time, the political costs to the government of a development 
policy were substantially reduced. Some of the development 
policy's principal backers have acknowledged that it was possible 
to enact it only because the political opposition had been so 
badly intimidated that it kept silent. The reticence of critics 
was due to a number of considerations. Fundamentally, they 
feared the political consequences of opposing the government at 
a time when their own positions were politically insecure. Only 
the most courageous would want to risk being branded "old order" 
sympathizers, or, if their anti-Sukarno credentials were impec­
cable, dupes. Besides, there was, and still is, a feeling that 
opposition would be futile. It would raise risks of embarrassing 
oneself politically without any real chance of having an impact 
on the government's policies. Apart from the political dangers 
of expressing their doubts, there is also the profound ambivalence 
of men who sincerely want to see their country develop and do not 
wish to hinder that effort, even if they do have misgivings about 
the foreign policy implications of the present development strategy. 
Even those directly responsible for Indonesia's foreign policy and 
development strategy are not insensitive to the dangers of dependence 
on foreign aid, but they simply see no alternative to the approach 
they have chosen to follow. In interviews, many Indonesians were 
clearly uneasy about expressing sentiments which might conceivably 
jeopardize their country's chances of getting the aid it needs.
Indonesia's foreign policy of development, then, is being 
carried out without the support of the underlying attitudes one 
might expect of a policy that emphasizes cooperation with the 
big powers and accepts dependence on the western powers for 
economic aid. The Indonesian leaders' view of the world makes 
them exceedingly suspicious of the motivations of the big powers
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and deeply ambivalent about their foreign policy of development.
They allow themselves to become dependent on foreign aid because 
they feel they have no choice, but they don't like it. This suggests 
that there is very great potential in Indonesia for an anti-foreign 
appeal. It may not be insignificant that some of those most directly 
identified with Indonesia's development foreign policy--that is, 
the foreign minister and the leading technocrats --have in the last 
year come under some harsh criticism in the press. In the fall of 
1970 certain Djakarta newspapers published highly critical editorials 
with title„s like "How to Sell a Nation/People."22 The leader in this 
campaign, which eased off after the start of 1971, was M e r d e k a, whose 
publisher, B. M. Diah, had been selected in October 1970 as chairman 
of the Indonesian Journalists Association, apparently with backing 
from army elements close to President Suharto. To what extent 
M e r d e k a ’s editorials represented the thinking of those army elements 
is unclear. But given the depth of suspicion about the outside world, 
it will be surprising if there are not more statements of this view­
point in the coming years, especially if the economy fails to show 
truly impressive progress. And to the degree that political power 
in Djakarta becomes more diffuse and political competition is 
restored, one may expect increasing challenges to Indonesia's foreign 
policy of development.
22. See Merdeka, December 7, 1970. See also the editions of October 
1, October 6, and December 4, 1970.
